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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

JAMES F. GARDNER,

:

Case No. 900225

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant James F. Gardner appeals his conviction for
second degree murder, a first degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990), entered upon a guilty plea in the
Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Uintah County, Utah,
the Honorable Richard C. Davidson, presiding, on April 2, 1985
(R. 684). He also appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, entered in the same court on April 2, 1990, the
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, District Court Judge Pro Tern, presiding
(R. 65, 282). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Has defendant alleged a question of "Indian

jurisdiction" sufficient to require either a reversal of his
conviction or a remand for jurisdictional fact findings?

The

Indian jurisdiction question is not mentioned in the trial court
record.

However, as will be set forth in this brief, the facts

already developed in the record permit this Court to review the
Indian jurisdiction question de novo and decide it as a matter of
law, without further proceedings.
2.

Should defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty

plea to second degree murder, on the ground that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered?

The trial court denied

defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

Under the standards

that apply to this case, the denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is reversed on appeal only if it plainly appears that
the trial court abused its discretion.

State v. Mildenhall, 747

P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, addresses
guilty pleas as follows:
(5) The [trial] court may refuse to accept
a plea of guilty or no contest, and may not
accept the plea until the court has found:
•

• •

(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a
jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine
in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him
for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
2

(f) if the tendered plea is a result of
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement,
and if so, what agreement has been reached .
The text of any other constitutional provisibns, statutes, and
rules pertinent to the resolution of this appeal is contained in
the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in state court with second degree
murder, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203 (1990), in connection with a killing that occurred on or
about March 6, 1985 (R. 1, 2). 1 He pleaded guilty to the charge
on April 2, 1985, and was sentenced to a term of five years to
life at the Utah State Prison (see R. 103-116, 110, 115,
reproduced at Addendum Exhibit 4 to Supplemental Br. of
Appellant).
Three years later, defendant, proceeding pro se,
asserted that his guilty plea had been involuntarily entered (R.
25-26).

He then obtained counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw

the plea (R. 61-62).

That motion was heard in the same court,

but by a different judge than the one who had originally accepted
the plea (R. 65, 103). After an evidentiary hearing (R. 302*Record references are designated "R." The transcript of the
hearing when defendant entered his guilty plea, the transcript of
the hearing on his motion to withdraw that plea, and certain
exhibits admitted in connection with that motion, have also been
numbered into the record, and references to those items are also
designated "Rj" some are also reproduced in the addenda to the pro
se Brief of Appellant and/or the Supplemental Brief of Appellant
filed by counsel. Some evidentiary exhibits were received but not
nvunbered into the record; those exhibits will be referenced by
their number or letter, e.g.. "State's exhibit X."

3

671), the trial court entered lengthy findings, and on April 2,
1990, denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea (R. 271-82,
reproduced at Addendum Exhibit 5 to Supp. Br. of Appellant).
Defendant appealed, filing a pro se opening brief; new appellate
counsel then filed a supplemental brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Crime
The killing in question was committed in Vernal, Utah
(R. 6; see also State's Exhibit E, received at R. 478-79; death
certificate and autopsy report, reproduced at Addendum C to pro
se Br. of Appellant).

About two days after the killing,

defendant spoke to Vernal police, and voluntarily stated that he
had committed it (see R. 86-101, reproduced at Addendum B to pro
se Br. of Appellant; State's Exh. H, received at R. 485). The
killing was again described at the hearing when defendant entered
his guilty plea (R. 109, 112-14).

In denying the motion to

withdraw his plea, the trial court relied on defendant's
statement to the police and the plea hearing description for its
findings, as follows:
During apparently extended "partying," including the
ingestion of alcohol and drugs, defendant went to a convenience
store to replenish his beer supply (R. 88, 90, 271). There he
met the male victim, Ricky Lane Abegglen, who invited defendant
to his Vernal apartment (id.; State's Exh. E, received at R. 47879, at 1). Defendant stated that after listening to a couple
albums of music, Abegglen kissed him on the mouth; enraged at
4

this homosexual act, defendant "pushed [Abegglen] back and I
kicked him and just remember beating him and then I stopped" (R.
88-89, 91-92, 271; State's Exh. H, at 2, 8).
This assault immobilized Abegglen, but he did not
immediately die. As Abegglen lay helpless, defendant put back on
his shoes, which he had removed upon entering the apartment, and
looked about the apartment for some food (R. 94, 113-14, 271;
State's Exh. H, at 5). Abegglen then began struggling to get up,
whereupon defendant attacked him again:
"I know I quit or something, and he was
laying there and he was breathing still, but
his choke, it sounded like he was choking on
his blood or something. And I remember I
kicked him because he kept trying to get up
once, and then he just didn't move man."
(R. 92; see also R. 113-14, 271; State's Exh. H, at 5).
Defendant stated that he unsuccessfully tried to resuscitate
Abegglen after this second attack (R. 94-95), and then fled in
Abegglen's car (R. 96, 272). He drove to various friends' and
relatives' homes, recounting the killing and requesting
assistance (R. 88-89, 93, 95, 272). He ultimately fled to a
friend's home on a Colorado Indian reservation, where tribal
police arrested him; defendant was subsequently turned over to
Vernal police (R. 87, 95-96).
The Guilty Plea
In considering the motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
the trial court examined the transcript of the plea hearing,
along with testimony and exhibits received during the motion
hearing.

At the plea hearing, represented by trial counsel,
5

defendant pleaded guilty to the killing as second degree murder.
In exchange for that plea, the State agreed to not prosecute the
killing as first degree murder, to forego the possibility of
automobile theft and habitual criminal charges, and to dismiss a
pending three-count, third degree felony forgery charge (R. 10708, 273).2
At the plea hearing, the trial court reviewed
defendant's constitutional trial rights.

The court did not

specifically inform defendant of his right against selfincrimination, but did inform him of the prosecution's burden of
proof, adding that •• [y]our counsel and you don't have to do
anything" for defendant to be found not guilty (R. 106, 278). In
response to court inquiries, defendant denied that he was then
under the influence of any intoxicants, and stated he had not
been coerced or otherwise improperly induced to plead guilty (R.
104, 107-09).
Defendant told the trial court that he had beaten
Abegglen (R. 109, 274). He denied intent to kill or to commit an
act clearly dangerous to human life (.id.)-

He admitted, however,

that he had "engage[d] in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another, and that therefore caused death" (id..). He
explained that Abegglen had "committed a homosexual act against
2

The dismissed forgeries were allegedly committed in Uintah
County. A second degree felony forgery, committed in Duchesne
County at about the same time, was prosecuted, and defendant was
convicted (see R. 516-18, and defendant's exhibit D-l, at 2-3).
That conviction was affirmed in State v. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv.
Rep. 46 (Utah App. March 18, 1992), petition for cert, filed. No.
920198 (Utah April 16, 1992).
6

me, and I don't care for homosexuals" (R. 113, 274). The
prosecutor then described the killing, relating the first attack,
followed by a "cool[ing] off," and then the second beating (R.
113-14, 275). Defense counsel confirmed this version of the
facts, differing only in that the second attack had been a single
kick rather than repeated blows (jLd.).
The trial court expressed specific concern that
defendant's account of the killing, if heard by a jury, might not
result in a guilty verdict for second degree murder.

Defendant,

however, reiterated his desire to plead guilty to that offense
(R. 114, 275):
THE COURT: You understand what you have
described to me, Mr. Gardner, the county
attorney will have a difficult time making
out a case of second degree murder?
THE WITNESS: Yes. I just don't want to take
it through a trial.
The trial court then reviewed the prosecutor's version of the
killing with defendant (R. 115, 275):
THE COURT: If you are not guilty of second
degree murder this court won't accept a plea
of second degree murder. Now, what the
county attorney described to me the jury
could very logically conclude that does meet
the limits of a second degree murder, if
those are the facts as they occured?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: It's still your desire to plead
guilty to that charge?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty
plea turned in part upon an allegation that his defense counsel
7

had improperly advised him (R. 79-84). Accordingly, that counsel
testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea (R.
463-602).

Counsel testified that defendant had steadfastly

wished to plead guilty, and avoid trial (R. 276, 278, 465, 497,
506, 509, 514). For his part, counsel had sought to protect
defendant from a possible first degree murder prosecution, as
well as from the forgery and habitual criminal charges; he had
discussed these concerns with defendant (R. 466, 493, 495-97,
513, 538).
Defense counsel advised defendant of the several
alternatives by which a jury might convict him of second degree
murder, from intentional killing to "depraved indifference" (R.
498-99, 510-11).

Because defendant was able to clearly relate

the killing, counsel believed that a diminished capacity defense,
based on defendant's alcohol and drug consumption, could not
succeed (R. 509-11).

Counsel believed that the interval between

the two beatings could be seen by a jury as a cooling off period
that would weigh against a lesser, manslaughter verdict (R. 52526).

He also believed that even if a manslaughter verdict were

possible, concurrent guilty verdicts were likely for forgery and
for theft of Abegglen's car, along with a possible habitual
criminal finding (R. 527, 530). Accordingly, based on
defendant's wishes, assessment of the risks, and upon
consultation with defendant's family, defendant and counsel had
decided that defendant would plead guilty to second degree murder
(R. 513-14).
8

In denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the
trial court also considered allegations that defendant's mental
state at the time he decided to enter the plea made the plea
involuntary.

While in jail before entering his plea, defendant

had been visited by a social worker who had observed defendant's
varying degrees of anxiety and despair (State's Exh. F, received
at R. 479). The social worker's notes reflect that medication
was prescribed to help defendant sleep, but do not express
concern that defendant's mental state made him unable to
competently assess his situation (id..)*

One such note, dated

five days before defendant entered his plea, relates that
defendant was then "beginning to realize the reality of going to
prison on a life sentence" (id., note dated March 28, 1985).
Defense counsel had also noted defendant's "depression"
during jail visits, and found this to be normal under the
circumstances.

Counsel also stated that defendant had

communicated clearly during consultations before entering his
plea (R. 487-88).

Accordingly, the trial court found that

defendant had not been mentally incapacitated when he entered the
plea (R. 277).
In moving to withdraw the plea, defendant also alleged
that his plea bargain was illusory (R. 68). The trial court
rejected this argument, finding that the prosecution had not
misrepresented the possibility of prosecuting defendant on other
charges (R. 280). Noting that a jury could have disbelieved
defendant's account of the killing, the court also ruled that a

9

first degree murder prosecution might have succeeded, such that
the prosecution's agreement to not elevate the charge to first
degree murder was also not illusory (R. 281)•
In light of the foregoing, the trial court found that
defendant's guilty plea had been knowingly and voluntarily made,
affirming the finding made five years earlier when the plea was
originally entered (R. 20). Accordingly, the motion to withdraw
the plea was denied (R. 282).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's jurisdictional challenge is best dealt with
summarily and on the merits.

Even if the challenge has not been

waived by failure to present it to the trial court, and even if
defendant is an "Indian," this crime was committed in Vernal,
Utah, which is outside "Indian country."

Therefore, the state

court had jurisdiction over this case.
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
properly denied.

His 1985 plea is subject to the requirement of

"substantial compliance" with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Further, under the substantial compliance rule, a

trial court's ruling on a plea withdrawal motion is reviewed on a
deferential, abuse of discretion standard.

The trial court

substantially complied with Rule 11 when it accepted defendant's
plea.

Further, the trial court's exhaustive analysis of the

motion to withdraw the plea confirms that the plea was knowingly
and voluntarily entered, and not induced by illusory promises.

10

The trial court's denial of the plea withdrawal motion, and
defendant's conviction, should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THIS CASE.
Defendant first argues that his conviction should be
reversed because the State failed to establish jurisdiction
(Supp. Br. of Appellant at 5). Alternatively, he argues that the
case should be remanded to determine jurisdiction (.id. at 7).
These arguments should be summarily rejected.
Normally, offenses committed within Utah are subject to
state court prosecution.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1990).

However, Utah courts do not have jurisdiction over offenses
committed by "Indians" within "Indian country."

See State v.

Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 746 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, No.
910017 (Utah April 23, 1991).

See generally Clinton, Criminal

Jurisdiction Over Indian Landst A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976).
Defendant's jurisdictional challenge is based upon his
assertions that he is an Indian for jurisdictional purposes, and
that he committed his crime in Indian country.

The present rule

in Utah is that when such an "Indian jurisdiction" challenge is
raised, the prosecution must prove state court jurisdiction—
i.e., that defendant is not an Indian, or the crime was not
committed in Indian country—by a preponderance of the evidence.
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747. Contra State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401,
11

403-04 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (defendant raising Indian
jurisdiction challenge must carry burden of proof).
The record on appeal shows no sign that defendant ever
raised an Indian jurisdiction challenge in the trial court.

He

argues, however, that "[t]he issue of jurisdiction may be raised
at any time" (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 5). He also provides a
personal affidavit purporting to show that he did raise the issue
in the trial court (id. at Addendum Exhibit l). 3
Defendant also appealed a 1985 forgery conviction, in
State v. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah App. March 18,
1992), petition for cert, filed. No. 920198 (Utah April 16,
1992).

In that appeal, he made similar jurisdictional arguments.

Responding, the State argued that an Indian jurisdiction
challenge is waivable, and that non-record materials could not
show that the challenge had been raised.

The pertinent portions

of the State's brief in the forgery case are reproduced at
Appendix I of this brief.

Should this Court reject the State's

primary argument in this case, the State's arguments in the
forgery case should be considered as backup arguments.
However, no backup arguments should be necessary.
Instead, under the State's primary argument, this Court may
assume, without deciding, that defendant's jurisdictional

3

There is no sign that a jurisdictional challenge was ever
mentioned in any court, in either defendant's forgery case, State
v. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah App. March 18, 1992), or in
this case, until after the court of appeals issued Hagen, on
November 23, 1990. Defendant's pro se brief in this case, filed
September 25, 1990, contains no Indian jurisdiction challenge.
12

challenge is properly before it, and not waived.

The Court may

also assume, without deciding, that defendant may be an Indian,
and not a "terminated" one, for jurisdictional purposes. C£.
Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 (under alleged facts, defendant
is a "terminated" mixed-blood Ute, expressly subject to state
criminal jurisdiction). Even under these assumptions, defendant
was clearly under state court jurisdiction, for he committed his
crime outside of Indian country.
As amply reflected in the record, defendant killed
Ricky Abegglen in the latter's Vernal, Utah apartment (R. 6; see
also State's Exhibit E, received at R. 478-79; death certificate
and autopsy report, reproduced at Addendum C to pro se Br. of
Appellant).

Although the trial court never specifically ruled on

this fact, defendant has never contested it.

This Court can

therefore confidently find, on the basis of the existing record,
that defendant committed the crime in Vernal.
Rather than contesting the situs of the crime,
defendant's jurisdictional challenge rests upon his assertion
that Vernal lies within Indian country.

He bases this fantastic

assertion on an imprecisely-drawn map, not part of the record but
appearing at Addendum Exhibit 3 to his Supplemental Brief,
purporting to identify "Ute Indian Territory ca. 1850."4

4

In Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D.
Utah 1981), the federal court criticized the parties' submission of
"a local cafe's dinner table placemat" as evidence in a reservation
boundary question, jLd. at 1150 n.202B. Defendant's map here seems
to offer little more in the way of authenticity or accuracy.

13

Defendant committed his crime 135 years too late to avail himself
of this definition of "Indian country."
Further, federal law expressly defines Indian country,
for criminal jurisdiction purposes, as all lands within Indian
reservations, plus certain "dependent Indian communities" and
"Indian allotments."

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).

The reservation

nearest to Vernal is the Uintah and Ouray Reservation; its
boundaries were exhaustively litigated in the 1980s.

See Ute

Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en
banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).

At no time in the

reservation's existence has Vernal been within its boundaries.
See map in Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1188, reproduced at
Appendix II of this brief (detailing original and current
reservation boundaries).

Nor does it appear that by any stretch

of imagination, Vernal can be considered a "dependent Indian
community" or "Indian allotment."

See United States v. Mound,

477 F. Supp. 156, 157-58 (C.D.S.D. 1979).
Defendant's jurisdictional challenge is therefore
meritless.

This Court may choose to give it minimal attention.

See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989).
POINT II
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY PLEADED
GUILTY TO SECOND DEGREE MURDER.
Defendant's next claim merits closer attention.

He

argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
because it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.
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The State

agrees that an accused's punishment should not depend upon a plea
of guilty that is unknowingly or involuntarily given.

See State

v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987) (discussing United
States Supreme Court cases).

Here, however, the trial court

correctly ruled that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered
his guilty plea.
A.

The Trial Court's Denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Defendant's 1985 Guilty Plea is Entitled to
Deference on Appeal.
At the outset, the proper standard of appellate review

must be identified.

For two reasons, the trial court's denial of

defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be given
deference on appeal.
First, defendant entered his guilty plea two years
before this Court decided Gibbons.

Gibbons requires a trial

court to establish, on the record, strict compliance with Rule
11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, before a guilty plea may
be accepted.

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-14; explained in State v.

Maauire, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah April 10, 1992), and State
v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Utah 1991).

The purpose of this

rule is to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.
Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1122.
However, in Hoff, this Court specifically held that the
"strict compliance" rule does not apply retroactively to preGibbons pleas.

Instead, such pleas are governed by the

requirement of "substantial compliance" with Rule 11(5).
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P.2d at 1123-24.

Therefore, this 1985 plea should be examined

for substantial, not strict, compliance with Rule 11(5).
Second, under the "substantial compliance" test, the
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reversed on
appeal only if it plainly appears that the trial court abused its
discretion.

State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987)

(construing Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990) (guilty plea may only
be withdrawn upon showing of good cause)).

Put differently, a

trial court's finding that a pre-Gibbons plea was knowing and
voluntary is reversed on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989).
Such deferential appellate review is particularly
appropriate here, because defendant's motion to withdraw his plea
was thoroughly litigated in the trial court.

The judge who heard

the motion was different from the one who accepted the plea,
reducing any concern that the judge might have been invested in
preserving "his" plea.

Defendant was assisted by professional

counsel in his motion (R. 302). Numerous exhibits were admitted,
and testimony was heard, during an eight-hour hearing, generating
357 pages of transcript (R. 305, 666). Finally, the trial court
reviewed the evidence in detail, generating a twelve-page,
single-spaced decision (R. 271-82).
carefully done is proper.
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Deferential review of a task

B.

All Evidence Received Bv the Trial Court in
Considering the Motion to Withdraw the Plea Should
be Considered bv this Court on Appeal.
Defendant has overlooked Hoff, and its clear holding

that pre-Gibbons guilty pleas are examined only for substantial
compliance with Rule 11(5).

He also asks this Court to disregard

"other information outside of the plea hearing transcript" in
reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw his
plea (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 14). This "other information"
consists of the documentary and testimonial evidence received by
the trial court in considering the plea withdrawal motion.
The State agrees that substantial compliance with Rule
11(5) is best addressed by examination of the plea hearing
transcript, as defendant requests.

However, with respect to the

ultimate question of whether the plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered, appellate reference to the evidence received
by the trial court in considering the motion to withdraw the plea
is both proper and necessary.

Review of that evidence is proper

because defendant's present request to disregard it amounts to an
objection that was not made in the trial court, which should be
rejected under Rule 103(1), Utah Rules of Evidence.5
Next, consideration of the evidence received during the
motion to withdraw the plea is necessary for reviewing
defendant's claim that his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly

defendant's request to disregard on-record evidence bearing
on his motion to withdraw his plea is astonishing in light of the
fact that he relies entirely on non-record materials in pursuing
his Indian jurisdiction claim.
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entered.

This, after all, is the core constitutional issue

decided by the trial court, and now on review here.

As the trial

court observed, all evidence bearing on the issue of whether the
plea was a product of defendant's informed, free choice is
relevant (R. 484). Accord Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah
1989) (reviewing record as a whole in deciding whether plea was
knowing and voluntary); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273-76
(Utah 1988) (same).
Defendant's request to ignore evidence received during
the motion to withdraw his plea is also an outright slap at the
trial court.

According to defendant, the trial court's effort to

resolve the motion fairly and accurately, by receiving all
evidence bearing on whether the guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made, is to be disregarded.

This is nonsense.

Therefore, the State will address the question of
whether the trial court substantially complied with Rule 11(5)
primarily through reference to the transcript of the plea
hearing.

However, the question of whether defendant's plea was

knowingly and voluntarily made—or, more accurately, the question
of whether the trial court correctly determined that it was so
made—will also be addressed with reference to all the evidence.
C.

Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Taken in Substantial
Compliance with Rule 11(5). Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Defendant alleges ten instances of non-compliance with

Rule 11(5) and other Rule 11 provisions by the trial court in
accepting his guilty plea (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 11-13).
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However, the plea hearing transcript demonstrates that the court
substantially complied with Rule 11.
First, defendant claims that the trial court failed to
advise him of the entire statutory charge.

To the contrary,

defendant was informed that he was charged with murder in the
second degree; the court then recited three ways in which
defendant might be guilty of that crime under Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203(1) (a), (b), and (c) (1990) (R. 105). The gist of the
court's recitation is correct, and two initially-omitted
statutory phrases can be viewed as surplusage.6

Further, in his

colloquy with the court, defendant specified that he was pleading
guilty only under subsection 76-5-203(1)(c), admitting that he
"engage[d] in conduct which created a grave risk of death to
another, and that therefore caused death" (R. 109).
Defendant also described the offense in his own words
(R. 109, 113), as approved by this Court in State v. Copeland,
765 P.2d 1266f 1273 (Utah 1988).

Under these circumstances, the

court substantially complied with the requirement that defendant
"understandf] the nature and elements of the offense to which he
is entering the plea . . .."

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(d).

Defendant next argues that the trial court did not
inform him that his guilty plea was an admission of the elements
of his crime, as required under Rule 11(5)(d).

6

This is

The court omitted "intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another" in reciting subsection (l)(b); it omitted "engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another" in reciting
the "depraved indifference" subsection, (l)(c).
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technically true; however, the court did tell defendant that at
trial, the prosecution would "have to go forward and prove each
and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt," as
required (R. 106). He was further told that he could only be
convicted upon a unanimous jury verdict (id.)-

And, as already

noted, defendant himself identified the particular statutory
elements that supported his guilt, denying those that he did not
believe applied to his crime (R. 109). Again, Rule 11(5)(d) was
substantially obeyed.
Defendant's distinction of the several ways in which he
could be guilty of second degree murder, and identification of
the specific way in which he believed himself to be guilty, also
clearly reflect his ability to understand the English language.
Defendant expressly denied that he was under the influence of
intoxicants when he entered the plea (R. 104). Nor does he argue
that he was too young, or mentally incompetent to understand the
proceeding.
11.

Such detailed inquiries are not required under Rule

However, the inquiries that were made, and defendant's

statements at the plea hearing, satisfied the trial court's core
obligation to assure that defendant understood the proceeding and
its consequences•
Defendant also complains that the court did not ask him
whether he had been provided a sufficient opportunity to fully
discuss his rights and his plea with his attorney.
non-compliance with Rule 11(1) is not borne out.
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This claim of
Defendant

agreed that defense counsel had discussed his rights with him,
and said he was satisfied with counsel's services (R. 105, 107).
Next, defendant asserts that he was not advised of his
right to subpoena witnesses on his behalf.

He is apparently-

referring to his sixth amendment right to "obtain[] witnesses in
his favor."

Rule 11 does not require recitation of this

information; defendant cannot amend the rule to include such
recitation, and then make that amendment retroactively
applicable.

As earlier noted, even "strict compliance" with the

rule as now written is not retroactively required.
Defendant was not expressly told of his right against
self-incrimination.

This is not error under the Rule 11

substantial compliance test, where the record otherwise shows
that defendant knowingly waived his rights. Warner v. Morris,
709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985).

Here, defendant was told, "Your

counsel and you don't have to do anything [in defense].

They

[the prosecution] have the burden of going forward, and if they
fail in their burden in any way then you are not going to be
found guilty" (R. 106-07).

This effectively informed him of his

right against self-incrimination.7

Defendant was also informed

of his cross-examination right (R. 106). The straightforward
explanation of his core fifth and sixth amendment rights
represents substantial compliance with Rule 11(5)(c) and (d).
7

Further, as noted by the trial court in denying the plea
withdrawal motion, at the time of his plea, defendant had been
twice given "Miranda" warnings by police, including the selfincrimination provision (R. 278; R. 87, reproduced at Addendum B to
pro se Br. of Appellant; State's Exh. H, received at R. 485).
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Defendant also complains that he was not told of his
right to State-paid counsel on possible appeal.
no such requirement.

Rule 11 contains

Indeed, the trial court went beyond Rule 11

in informing defendant of a counsel-assisted appeal right from
any jury verdict of guilty, and warning him that his guilty plea
amounted to a relinquishment of that right (R. 106, 107).
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to inform
him of the possible sentences for second degree murder, as
required by Rule 11(5)(e).

Not true.

The trial court initially

omitted this information, but then specifically corrected itself,
warning defendant of a possible five-to-life sentence plus a
fine.

The court then asked, "Does that make any difference to

your plea previously entered?"
(R. 111-12).

Defendant responded, "No, sir"

Defendant's suggestion that this exchange did not

correct the initial oversight violates common sense.
Defendant also points out that the possibility of
consecutive sentences was not explained to him, referring to the
fact that he was on parole from an Oregon prison when he
committed the Utah killing (R. 110). By its terms, however, the
applicable Rule 11(5)(e) requirement appears directed to
situations where a defendant pleads guilty to several offenses;
defendant cites no authority to the contrary.

Because this plea

was to a single offense, the question of consecutive versus
concurrent sentencing was not an issue in taking the plea.
Additionally, any impact that defendant's murder plea
might have upon his parole in another state should be regarded as
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a "collateral consequence," rather than a sentencing possibility.
It is widely held that full knowledge of every possible
collateral consequence of a guilty plea is not necessary for the
plea to be valid.

See United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919,

922 (2nd Cir. 1954); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803, 807 (D.
Utah 1968); Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo. 1988).
Further, defendant was presumably aware, better than anyone else
involved, of the terms of his Oregon parole, and the likely
consequence of his Utah plea upon it.8

In not advising

defendant of possible "consecutive sentences," then, the trial
court did not fail to substantially comply with Rule 11.
Defendant also complains that the plea colloquy was
generally inadequate, apparently asserting that the trial court
did not adequately examine the factual basis for the guilty plea
(Supp. Br. of Appellant at 12). In this regard, the Utah Court
of Appeals has pointed out that Utah's Rule 11, unlike its
federal counterpart, does not require a review of the evidence
before accepting a guilty plea.

State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,

478 & n.3 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. No. 910347 (Utah Feb.
28, 1992).

The proper inquiry, then, is whether the trial court

abused its discretion in not conducting a more searching fact

8

See Carson, 755 P.2d at 244-45: MWe will not require our
trial courts to consult astrologers or invoke psychic powers to
comply with [Rule 11 analogue] Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P."
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, it was
learned Oregon authorities agreed to terminate any hold they might
have on defendant if he was committed in Utah (R. 495). This was
a benefit received for his plea, and also indicates that any
failure to probe his parole status was ultimately harmless.
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inquiry.

Smith, 812 P.2d at 478. No such abuse of discretion

occurred here.
Indeed, the trial court was particularly concerned that
the prosecution might not be able to convict defendant of second
degree murder (R. 114). In response to this expressed concern,
defendant stated that he did not wish to proceed to trial (id.).
The court then warned defendant that it would not accept a plea
to second degree murder if he was not guilty of that offense; it
noted, however, that a jury could find him guilty if it agreed
with the facts as recited by the prosecutor.

Defendant then

reiterated his desire to plead guilty (R. 115). This colloquy
amply established that defendant was knowingly and voluntarily
entering his plea; indeed, he was determined to do so.
Thus the trial court did everything but advise
defendant against making the plea.

Had it so advised defendant,

the court would have arguably violated Rule 11(8)(a), which
prohibits the court from participating in "plea discussions."
See State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301 (Utah 1986).

Defendant's

vague complaint that the colloquy should have been "much more
thorough" (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 12) should therefore be
rejected:

the trial court properly exercised its discretion in

examining the factual bases for the plea.
It should also be noted that the trial court
specifically asked defendant whether he had been induced to enter
his guilty plea by improper promises or threats (R. 107-08).
This inquiry disclosed the State's agreement to forego possible
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first degree murder, auto theft, and habitual criminal charges;
the State also expressly stated that it would not recommend
lenient sentencing (R. 108). That done, defendant affirmed that
he freely chose to enter the plea, and that he was guilty of
second degree murder (R. 109). The trial court thus gave special
attention to the Rule 11(5)(b) requirement that a guilty plea be
voluntarily made.
In sum, defendant's Rule 11-based complaints cannot
prevail.

The trial court substantially complied with the rule,

and in some respects exceeded its requirements, when it accepted
defendant's guilty plea.
D.

Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Otherwise Knowingly
and Voluntarily Entered.
The trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw

defendant's guilty plea may be subject to affirmance solely on
the basis of substantial compliance with Rule 11 when the plea
was entered.

However, in denying the plea withdrawal motion, the

court did not restrict itself to the letter of Rule 11.

Instead,

it carefully examined whether the plea had been knowingly and
voluntarily entered.

As follows, the trial court correctly ruled

that it was so entered.
At the outset, a distinctive feature should be noted.
In denying the motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court found
that M[a] review of the record indicates that Defendant was
determined to conclude this matter by entering a plea.

He

expressed his desire to end this matter quickly to the police,
his family, his attorney, and the Court" (R. 278). On appeal,
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defendant does not contest this finding, which is amply supported
by the evidence.

See R. 100-01 (police statement), R. 436-37,

445 (testimony of defendant's mother and sister), R. 465, 501,
509 (testimony of defense counsel), R. 114, 115 (plea hearing).
Under such circumstances, this Court has upheld a
guilty plea against a claim that it was improperly received.
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968, 970 (1968)
(defendant had "indicated his desire to waive trial and enter a
plea of guilty").

And even if defendant's desire to plead guilty

was driven by the emotional distress observed by counsel and by
the social worker who visited him in jail (R. 487-88; State's
Exh. F, received at R. 479), this does not render his plea
involuntary.

See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Utah 1989)

("mere distress, nervousness, or emotional upset at the time of
pleading does not establish mental incompetence to plead").
Further, before entering his plea on April 2, 1985,
defendant was aware that the likely consequence would be five
years to life imprisonment (R. 502; State's Exh. F, note dated
March 28, 1985).

Defendant's consistent desire to enter the

plea, and his awareness of its likely consequence at the time it
was entered, should be borne in mind now, seven years later, in
considering arguments aimed toward escaping that consequence.
1.

Claim of "Illusory Plea Bargain."

Defendant argues that his plea bargain was illusory, in
that the charges foregone in exchange for the plea could not have
succeeded (pro se Br. of Appellant at 4-7). This argument, first
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of all, can be rejected as an effort to try those charges at the
appellate level:

his plea was a waiver of trial. As to those

charges, defendant makes no claim that the concurrently pending
forgery charges could not have succeeded; therefore, he did
benefit from the dismissal of those charges (R. 107-08).
Defendant does claim that he could not have been
convicted of first degree murder, such that the prosecution's
agreement to forego that charge was illusory.

However, the trial

court determined that there was a basis for the prosecution to
believe, in good faith, that a first degree murder prosecution
might succeed (R. 281). Relying on State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546, 571 (Utah 1987) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202
(1990)), the court noted that first degree murder occurs when a
killing is committed during commission of a number of enumerated
crimes.

The court further noted that burglary or aggravated

burglary, among those enumerated crimes, might be shown, based
upon defendant's two attacks on the victim, separated by time he
spent looking through the victim's home.

This analysis is

consistent with defense counsel's explanation to defendant of a
possible first degree murder conviction (R. 496). Finally, even
if the risk of such a conviction was low, it was not wholly
absent, and avoidance of that risk was a benefit received for the
plea.

Thus the agreement to forego the first degree murder

charge was not illusory.
Defendant also complains that the habitual criminal
charge could not have succeeded, such that foregoing this charge
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was also illusory.

However, at the plea hearing, the prosecutor

pointed out that a possible auto theft charge "may allow or may
have allowed" a habitual criminal determination (R. 108); the
possibility was not presented as a certainty.

The possibility

had been discussed by defendant and counsel in reaching the
decision to enter the second degree murder plea (R. 493). That
decision—to avoid a "possibility"—might be second-guessed, but
such second-guessing cannot establish that the plea was
involuntary or unknowing.
2.

Claim of "Confusion- About Offense.

Defendant also claims that he was confused about the
murder charge during the plea hearing (pro se Br. of Appellant at
13-15).

He says he became confused because of the trial court's

reference to the possibility that defendant might have killed the
victim in the "heat of passion" (R. 113), apparently referring to
a possible manslaughter verdict under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5205(1)(b) (1990) (causing death while under "extreme emotional
disturbance").

At the hearing of the plea withdrawal motion,

defendant claimed that he thought the trial court was thus
"derogatorily calling [him] a homosexual" (R. 411).
This claim is met by two responses.

First, the trial

court was not obliged to believe defendant's testimony, nearly
five years after the fact, as to his "confusion" during the plea
hearing.

State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977).
Second, any "confusion" or homophobic upset possibly

caused by the "heat of passion" reference was obviated by
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defendant's explicit admission to second degree murder under the
"depraved indifference" provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(c)
(1990), while denying the alternative intentional killing
elements of the crime.

That admission was planned after detailed

consultation with counsel about the possible second degree murder
elements (R. 498-99).

His "confusion" did not cause him to plead

other than planned; instead, he stuck to his plan.
3.

Claim of "Unknowing" Mental State.

Defendant also emphasizes his statement, at one point
in the plea hearing, that he did not "know what he was doing"
when he killed the victim (pro se Br. of Appellant at 13-14; R.
113).

He argues that this statement shows that he did not

"consciously engage" in conduct that caused death, and therefore
was not guilty of "depraved indifference" murder.

This isolated

statement contradicts his own version of the killing at the plea
hearing:

"He [the victim] committed a homosexual act against me,

and I don't care for homosexuals" (R. 113).
Further, defendant never denied that the beating
consisted of two episodes (R. 113-14); his detailed recitation of
the killing shows an ability to recall the event that belies any
suggestion that nc did not know what he was doing (see R. 92; R.
276-77).

Defendant's own recollection of the circumstances of

the killing therefore shows that he had sufficient knowledge of
his action to establish the form of second degree murder to which
he pleaded guilty.

See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045-47

(Utah 1984) (requisite "knowing" mental state for depraved
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indifference murder can be inferred from circumstances) (R. 280).
Andf once again, this assessment had been made by defense
counsel, and discussed with defendant, in deciding to enter the
guilty plea (R. 509-11, 525-26).
4.

Effectiveness of Defense Counsel.

Defendant also argues that his plea was unknowingly
entered because his counsel failed to adequately advise him of
all possible defenses to second degree murder (pro se Br. of
Appellant at 27-34).

In denying the plea withdrawal motion, the

trial court found that defense counsel had functioned "within the
broad range of choices that competent counsel may have made in
undertaking the defense" (R. 278; R. 275, 276). In so ruling,
the trial court correctly applied Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), followed by this Court in State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990).

Those cases hold that "[jJudicial scrutiny

of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," accounting
for "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Templin, 805 P.2d at 188.
Defense counsel acknowledged that in consulting with
defendant, he discussed the possibility of manslaughter "a little
bit;" the emphasis was apparently on second degree murder (R.
498).

Defendant now argues that counsel should have aggressively

advised him to go to trial, in hopes that a manslaughter
conviction—and attendant lesser punishment—might have resulted.
This is tantamount to a suggestion that counsel should have
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performed unreasonably, contrary to his client's consistent wish
to resolve the matter through a guilty plea (R. 278, 596).
Further, even if defendant misunderstood the "heat of
passion" manslaughter possibility, the evidence is that counsel
had thought this approach through, and concluded that it could
very well fail.

This, again, was based upon his assessment that

a "cooling-down" period between defendant's two attacks on the
victim could have been found by a trial jury (R. 496, 582, 59899).

Counsel further believed that a jury might disbelieve

defendant's description of the killing, and find that he had
committed it in the course of a deliberate robbery (R. 576).9
Either eventuality could have led to a second degree murder
conviction, or worse.

Counsel's decision to not pursue the

manslaughter possibility more aggressively, then, arose both from
his client's desire and considered professional judgment.
The trial court thus correctly found that defendant had
been competently represented by counsel in entering his guilty
plea.

Accordingly, it is not necessary to ask whether, had

counsel performed differently, there was a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result, as needed to complete a Strickland
ineffective counsel claim.
118-19 n.2 (Utah 1989).

See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,

It is observed, however, that defendant

can merely speculate that he would have been found guilty only of
manslaughter had this matter proceeded to trial.
9

This possibility was noted by a police officer who
investigated the case. See State's Exh. E, admitted at R. 171-72,
at pp. 2-3.
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Speculating to the contrary, defendant might have been
found guilty of first degree murder, forgery, burglary, or theft,
and received a habitual criminal judgment.

These possibilities

could have led to the same or worse punishment than he received
through his plea.

See Utah Code Ann. S§ 76-3-206(1), 76-5-202(2)

(first degree murder: life sentence or death); 76-8-1001
(habitual offender may be sentenced to life imprisonment) (1990).
Any "more favorable result" speculation therefore fails.
Summary
The trial court took care to review all evidence
pertinent to the offer and acceptance of defendant's guilty plea
at the time it was entered (see R. 484). As a result, it
developed a comprehensive record of the circumstances surrounding
that plea.

Compare Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 239-40

(1969) (trial court record was "wholly silent" on voluntariness
question).

Defendant's decision to plead guilty might, in

hindsight, be deemed unwise; defendant may now fervently regret
it.

However, the trial court, based on all the evidence, found

that defendant's decision was knowing and voluntary.
finding should be honored by this Court.
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That

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction of
second degree murder, and the denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea to that offense, should be affirmed.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The forgery for which defendant was convicted occurred
in the city of Roosevelt (T. 8/14/85 at 18), which lies within
the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.

See

map appended to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp.
1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981).

Trial testimony showed that defendant

had, without authorization, obtained check blanks belonging to
his brother-in-law and negotiated one of these for 150 dollars
(T. 8/14/85 at 10-12, 15-16).l
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant never raised his jurisdictional challenge in
the trial court.

Nor was the the prosecution or the trial court

otherwise informed of the need to prove jurisdiction by showing
that defendant is not an Indian.
Indian jurisdiction is usually treated as a question of
subject matter jurisdiction, which is not waived by the absence
of a timely trial court objection.

However, based on policy

considerations and sound precedent, this jurisdictional challenge
should be considered waived by defendant's failure to raise it in
the trial court, and the conviction should be affirmed.
If defendant's belated factual assertions about Indian
status are assumed to be true, his conviction should be affirmed
under the Ute Partition Act of 1954. Under that Act, defendant,

*Record citations: "R.,f refers to the trial court record in
this case only, defendant's forgery conviction. "T.M refers to
hearing transcripts on the date indicated in this case, including
defendant's petition for postconviction relief.
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as a "mixed-blood" Ute Indian, is subject to state court criminal
jurisdiction.
If this court will not affirm the conviction on either
of the foregoing bases, the resolution of this jurisdictional
challenge still turns on the fact-sensitive issue of whether
defendant is an Indian.

In this event, because no evidence on

this issue exists in the present trial court record, defendant's
challenge should be remanded to the trial court.

On remand,

defendant should bear the burden of proving that jurisdiction was
lacking.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
Some background on the law of Indian criminal
jurisdiction as it applies to this case is helpful to place the
arguments in perspective.

A thorough overview is found in

Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976)
("Clinton") (copied at Appendix 1 of this brief).

As a general

rule, criminal jurisdiction over Indian country rests exclusively
with the federal courts.

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; Utah Const.

Art. Ill; 18 U.S.C. SS 1152, 1153 (1988); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d
28, 29 (7th Cir. 1938), cert, denied, 306 U.S. 643, 59 S. Ct. 581
(1939); Clinton at 523 & n. 94.
Congress, however, has authorized certain exceptions to
the general rule.

Title 18 U.S.C, sections 1152 and 1153, read

together, specifically except "minor" Indian against Indian
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crimes within Indian country from exclusive federal
jurisdiction.2
courts.

Jurisdiction over such crimes is in the tribal

United States v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2, 97 S.

Ct. 1395, 1397 n. 2 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 61, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess., at 3-4, (1991) (attached as exhibit D to Br. of
Appellant).3
Congress has also granted some states criminal
jurisdiction over at least portions of Indian country, under 18
U.S.C. S 1162 (1988).
grant of jurisdiction.

Utah is not included under this particular
Congress now also allows state

jurisdiction over Indian offenses in Indian country upon the
express consent of Indian tribes, and Utah has expressed its
willingness to accept such jurisdiction.

25 U.S.C. S 1321

(1988); Utah Code Ann. S 63-36-201 (Supp. 1991).

To date,

however, Utah has received no tribal consent to state
jurisdiction under these provisions.
However, another important source of congressionallyauthorized state jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country
2

Section 1152 states that federal jurisdiction "shall not
extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian . . . ." However, section 1153, the
Major Crimes Act, takes back much of this section 1152 exception,
bringing certain major crimes by Indians in Indian country, whether
or not against other Indians, within federal jurisdiction.
Clinton questions whether tribal jurisdiction over Indian
against Indian crimes is indeed limited to minor crimes. 18 Ariz.
L. Rev. at 559-60. However, tribal courts are limited in the
punishment they may mete out, to one year imprisonment or a
$5000.00 fine, or both, per offense. 25 U.S.C. S 1302(7) (1988).
3

Section 1152 also exempts crimes punished by tribal law, and
crimes where jurisdiction rests in the tribe by treaty, from
federal jurisdiction.
Clinton reports that the only treaties
vesting criminal jurisdiction in Indian tribes were executed before
the end of the eighteenth century. Clinton at 531 & n. 128.

exists in the various Indian tribe "termination acts," passed
largely in the 1950s.
550-51.

Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 548 & n. 220,

This source of state jurisdiction is significant here,

in that "mixed-blood" Ute Indians were terminated from federal
supervision and placed under state jurisdiction by the Ute
Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C. SS 677-677aa (1988).
A major judicially-created exception to exclusive
federal jurisdiction over Indian country is that crimes in Indian
country where neither the victim nor the perpetrator is an Indian
are subject to state jurisdiction.

United States v. Wheeler, 435

U.S. 313, 324, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (1978), cited in Goforth v.
State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Clinton, 18
Ariz. L. Rev. at 524-25.
Finally, the jurisdiction exercised by tribal courts
varies from tribe to tribe.

Here, the Ute Indian Tribe, which

occupies the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, does not take
jurisdiction of cases where the parties are not formally enrolled
members of that tribe, where an alternative forum exists to
resolve the case, and where tribal interests are not affected.
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah. 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 n.8
(D. Utah 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596
(1986) (citing Ute Tribe Law and Order Code).
The forgoing jurisdictional rules effectively provide
that where the perpetrator or the victim of a crime, but not
both, are Indian, and the crime is committed within Indian
8

country, then jurisdiction rests exclusively with the federal
court.

However, even if a criminal defendant is an Indian, he or

she will fall under state jurisdiction if a federal termination
act so provides. Where neither the perpetrator nor the victim is
an Indian, even where the crime occurs in Indian country, the
state court has jurisdiction.

If both perpetrator and victim are

Indian, and the crime occurs in Indian country and is "minor,"
then tribal courts may have jurisdiction.
Here, defendant does not allege that both he and the
victim of his crime are Indians, nor does he otherwise suggest
that jurisdiction properly lies in the Ute tribal court.

Indeed,

under Ute tribal law, he has no basis for such an assertion,
because he does not claim to be formally enrolled in that tribe.
Instead, defendant's claim is that only the federal district
court had jurisdiction to try him for the forgery (Br. of
Appellant at 5, 6). Thus the claimed jurisdictional conflict is
only between state and federal jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM WAS WAIVED BY THE
FAILURE TO RAISE IT IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND
THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
A.

To Fall Outside State Jurisdiction Under
Present Law, Defendant Must be an Indian.
As explained in the introduction to this argument, in

order for defendant to fall outside of state jurisdiction, his
crime must have been committed in Indian country, and defendant
must be an Indian.

Under the present law of this Court, the
9

forgery was committed in Indian country, because Roosevelt lies
within the outer boundary of an Indian reservation.

State v.

Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April
23, 1991, Utah Supreme Court No. 910017. This law may change,
however, pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
in Hagen and the pending case of State v. Perank, Utah Supreme
Court No. 860196.

Both those cases deal with the question of

whether the town of Myton, near Roosevelt, is no longer Indian
country, because of federal "disestablishment" of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation.4
If the supreme court rules in favor of the State in
Haaen and Perank, it is likely that Roosevelt can also be held
not to be Indian country.

In that case, even if defendant is an

Indian, his conviction would be proper because the crime was
committed outside of Indian country, under exclusive state court
jurisdiction.

St. Cloud v. United States. 702 F. Supp. 1456,

1459 (D.S.D. 1988) ("State courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes occurring outside of Indian country").

See also Utah

Code Ann. S 76-1-201(a) (1990) (Utah state courts have
jurisdiction over offenses committed within the state).

As it

did in Hagen, then, the State suggests that it may be wise for
this court to await the outcome of Perank, and now also Haaen. in
the supreme court before deciding this case.
However, even if the Indian country status of Roosevelt

4

The State's brief in Hagen, including a portion of its brief
in Perank, is copied at Appendix 2 of this brief.
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must be accepted for the time being, it cannot be conceded that
defendant is an Indian.

Even now, he has provided no independent

corroboration of Indian status, but relies solely on the naked
allegations in his brief and attached affidavit.
The two elements required to prove Indian status are
recited in Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2. First, it must appear
that defendant has a significant percentage of Indian blood, and
second, defendant must be recognized as an Indian either by the
federal government or some group of Indians. JDd. (citations
omitted); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938); Clinton,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503, 515-16 (1976) (copied
at Appendix 1 of this brief).
The foregoing elements of Indian status are highly
fact-dependent.

The "Indian blood" element, for example,

presents a question of fact, quite apart from the legal question
of how much Indian blood is sufficient to satisfy that element.
See Hacren, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2 (noting division of authority en
the latter question).

See Brief of Appellant at 36 (alleging

Indian ancestry).
The allegations now made by defendant to support the
"recognition" element of Indian status are also factual issues.
See Brief of Appellant at 35-36 (alleging history of Indian
upbringing, receipt of Indian benefits, participation in Indian
culture, membership in Indian organizations). However, defendant
raised no jurisdictional challenge and presented no evidence on
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any factual issues related to Indian status in the trial court.
B.

The Jurisdictional Problem in this Case was
Neither Raised Nor Otherwise Apparent to the Trial
Court.
In his brief on appeal and the affidavit he has

attached to that brief, defendant asserts that he raised his
jurisdictional challenge in the trial court, and that his
challenge was repeatedly rebuffed (Br. of Appellant at 2, 3, 9).
None of these assertions are documented by record citations, as
required by Utah R. App. P. 24(e).
Neither defendant's brief nor the affidavit attached to
that brief are part of the record on appeal, because neither is
an original paper or exhibit filed with the trial court.
App. P. 11(a).

Utah R.

Therefore, the factual allegations therein, to

the extent they are offered as evidence, should be ignored.
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to
matters outside the record are inappropriate, irrelevant, and
will not be considered on appeal).

Further, the State's

examination of the actual record has revealed no jurisdictional
challenge.5
5

For example, defendant
claims that he raised his
jurisdictional challenge on or about March 18, 1985 (Br. of
Appellant at 2). The record shows that a hearing was held on March
19, 1985, but the minute entry commemorating that hearing does not
mention any jurisdictional challenge (R. 7).
Defendant claims to have renewed his jurisdictional challenge
during an in-chambers conference just before his forgery trial, on
August 14, 1985 (affidavit attached to Br. of Appellant, at 3(A)).
However, the record reveals only a motion in limine, which was
granted (T. 8/14/85 at 3-4), and a later motion to dismiss based on
insufficient evidence, which was denied (T. 8/14/85 at 27-28).
Finally, defendant also claims that he raised his
jurisdictional challenge during proceedings involving a murder
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Defendant also failed to raise the jurisdictional issue
at any point in the trial court proceedings associated with his
petition for postconviction relief in this case (e.g.,
T. 3/1/90).

R. 56-59;

Thus he raises the Indian jurisdiction issue for the

first time on appeal.
Consistent with the absence of any jurisdictional
challenge, the trial court records are otherwise devoid of any
evidence that defendant is an Indian.

The issue did not even

arise inadvertently through evidence and testimony routinely
presented in the case. Additionally, it does not appear that the
possibility of Indian status should have been obvious to the
trial court.

Defendant's name does not suggest that he is an

Indian, and the record contains no reference to his race. As
follows, then, because the Indian jurisdiction issue was not
raised in the trial court, it should be deemed waived on appeal.
C.

The Indian Status Issue Should be Deemed
Waived bv Defendant's Failure to Raise it in
the Trial Court.
Defendant argues that the state court lacked "Personal,

Subject Matter, and territorial Jurisdiction" to prosecute him
for the forgery (Br. of Appellant at 5).

To resolve this appeal,

some consideration must be given to which, if any, of these types
of jurisdictional problems exists here.
The "territorial jurisdiction" problem appears to
charge that was pending against him at the same time as the forgery
charge (Br. of Appellant at 2). The murder case record is not a
part of the record in this case. Accordingly, references to the
murder case should also be ignored, and will not be further
addressed in the State's brief.
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address the status of the place where the forgery occurred,
specifically, whether Roosevelt is Indian country.

As noted,

because that issue is pending before the Utah Supreme Court in
Hagen and Perank, the State, without conceding it, will not
further address it in this brief.
It remains to be determined whether the jurisdictional
problem should be treated as one of personal jurisdiction or as
subject matter jurisdiction.

As follows, the State's position is

that while the problem resembles subject matter jurisdiction, it
should be treated here as having been waived, like personal
jurisdiction, by the failure to present it in the trial court.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (applicable to criminal proceedings via
Utah R. Civ. P. 81) (personal jurisdiction defect is waived if
not raised in trial court).
Utah law is unsettled on the question of whether Indian
jurisdiction should be treated as personal jurisdiction or
subject matter jurisdiction.

In State Dep't of Social Services

v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court
avoided the question in a civil context, reversing a judgment for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby not reaching
defendant's claim that personal jurisdiction was also lacking.
Id. at 1134.

In Haaen and State v. Coando. 784 P.2d 1228, 1229

(Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, Utah Supreme Court No. 900019
(March 7, 1990), this Court treated the problem in the criminal
context without reference to whether it involved personal or
subject matter jurisdiction.
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Because Indian jurisdiction involves the allocation of
authority among various courts, it would appear to involve
subject matter jurisdiction.

Indeed, it has been held that

Indian criminal jurisdiction, like subject matter jurisdiction,
cannot be waived by the failure to raise it or by consent of the
parties.

See St. Cloud. 702 F. Supp. at 1458; In re Carmen's

Petition. 165 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1958), aff'd sub nom.
Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9 Cir. 1959), cert, denied. 361
U.S. 934, 80 S. Ct. 375, reh#g denied, 361 U.S. 973, 80 S. Ct.
585 (1960); Wesley v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 290, 346 P.2d 658#
662 (1959) (en banc).

See also Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 528

("the issue is subject matter jurisdictionH).
However, it is questionable whether Indian criminal
jurisdiction must be strictly treated as non-waivable, subject
matter jurisdiction.

One authority does not cast general

criminal jurisdiction in terms of personal versus subject matter
jurisdiction at all, but rather as the power to create criminal
laws versus the power to enforce them.

1 W. LaFave & A. Scott,

Substantive Criminal Law S 2.7(a) (1986).

Notwithstanding the

authority to the contrary, it has been held, as follows, that the
issue of Indian criminal jurisdiction can be waived.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applies a "raise it or lose it" approach to the federal
prosecution of non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian country:
It is far more manageable for the defendant
to shoulder the burden of producing evidence
that he is a member of a federally recognized
tribe than it is for the Government to
15

produce evidence that he is not a member of
any one of the hundreds of such tribes. We
accordingly hold that the Government need not
allege the non-Indian status of the defendant
in an indictment under [18 U.S.C.A.] section
1152, nor does it have the burden of going
forward on that issue. Once the defendant
properly raises the issue of his Indian
status, then the ultimate burden of proof
remains, of course, upon the Government.
United States v. Hester. 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983).
Hester thus held that it is not necessary for the prosecution to
allege or prove a defendant's non-Indian status until and unless
the issue is raised by the defendant.
For several reasons, the Hester approach is sound in a
case like this, where neither the prosecution nor the trial court
were on notice that an Indian jurisdiction problem might exist.
First, if strictly treated as subject matter and entertained even
though not timely presented, a parade of other state-convicted
felons who committed their crimes in Indian country can be
expected to raise similar uncorroborated claims that they are
"Indians" and demand that their convictions be reversed.

This is

a particularly nightmarish possibility if the burden is placed on
the State disprove such belated claims.6
Second, it is the criminal defendant who will best know
his or her own racial and social background.

It is therefore

reasonable to expect the defendant to raise the Indian
jurisdiction issue.

Such an expectation would not shift the

6

As explained in Point Three, section C of this brief, the
State's position is that the burden of proving Indian status should
rest with defendant where the Indian jurisdiction challenge is not
raised until after the conviction.
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ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction at trial, which, under
Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747, lies with the prosecution.7

It would

simply provide the prosecution with notice that the burden exists
in the special Indian jurisdiction context, when it is not
otherwise apparent.
Third, under the Federal Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1152
(1988), and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 13 (1988),
if defendant were tried in the federal court, that forum would
apply Utah's forgery statute to his offense.

See United States

v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 1971), cert, denied,
404 U.S. 842, 97 S. Ct. 137 (Montana forgery statute applied to
Indian country prosecution in federal court).

Defendant does not

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that supports his
conviction.

Therefore, there is no reason to assume that he

would receive any better treatment or a more favorable outcome in
the federal court, applying Utah law.

In this light, defendant's

effort to challenge jurisdiction can be seen as nothing more than
forum shopping.

To entertain his challenge now would encourage

criminal defendants who may be Indians to withhold that claim in
the state court and then, if convicted, raise it to avoid the
conviction.

Requiring the issue to be raised in the trial court

will discourage the temptation to thus "plant error,f in the trial
court, a practice this court has condemned.

See State v.

Belaard, 811 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah App. 1991).
7

Contra, State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 403-04 (Okla. Crim.
App, 1989) (defendant seeking to avoid state jurisdiction has
burden of proving Indian status).
17

Fourth, a "raise it or lose it" approach is also
consistent with Haaen.

In Haaen, the reversible error was the

State's failure, in the trial court, "to prove he [defendant] is
not an Indian when confronted with his claim that he is.." 802
P.2d at 746 (emphasis added).

Haaen thus assumes that the claim

of Indian status will be raised in the trial court.

Such claim

was absent here; nor, as noted earlier, was the possibility of
that claim otherwise apparent.

Compare In re Carmen's Petition,

165 F. Supp. at 950 (although jurisdictional challenge not
formally raised, trial testimony that defendant was an Indian put
court on notice of problem, and challenge was not waived).
Finally, it should be noted that in other contexts, a
failure to raise a jurisdictional defect in the trial court
operates as a waiver of the defect on appeal.

E.g., State v.

Smith, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 42 (Utah App. 1991) and State v.
Ouintana, No. 900264-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah App. Oct. 4, 1991)
(State's failure to raise untimeliness of motion to withdraw
plea, arguably jurisdictional in character, waived where not
properly raised in trial court).

See also State v. Pierce. 782

P.2d 194, 196 (Utah App. 1989) (non-expiration of criminal
statute of limitations is jurisdictional issue to be proven by
prosecution "whenever that issue is properly raised").
In sum, because defendant did not make his present
allegations of Indian status in the trial court, and because
neither the State nor the trial court was otherwise on notice
that defendant might be an Indian, this court should hold that
18

defendant waived the issue. Accordingly, his forgery conviction
should be affirmed.
POINT II
IF DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN, HE IS SUBJECT TO
STATE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL
TERMINATION OF SUPERVISION OVER MIXED-BLOOD
UTE INDIANS.
Even if defendant's undocumented allegations of Indian
status are taken as true, his conviction should be affirmed
because his claimed Indian affiliation is with a group of Indians
that has long been "terminated" from federal criminal
jurisdiction.

Defendant alleges that he is a member of the

Uintah Band of Ute Indians, and that he is associated with the
Affiliated Ute Citizens organization, groups that he identifies
as "Distinct Legal entit[ies]" (Br* of Appellant at 38-39)•
Regarding the first allegation, defendant says that he
is Ma Recognized Member of the Uintah Band By Other Members
thereof" (Br. of Appellant at 28), and does not say that he is
formally enrolled in that band.

He also cites his mother's

listing on the final roll of "mixed-blood" Ute Indians, published
in the April 5, 1956 Federal Register8 (Br. of Appellant at 36),
as a basis for his Uintah band membership.
As to the alleged membership in the Affiliated Ute
Citizens, that entity is an organization of mixed-blood Ute
Indians formed in 1956.

It was formed for the purpose of

representing the mixed-bloods in the distribution of tribal

8

Copied at Appendix 3 of this brief.
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assets under the Ute Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C.A. SS 677677aa (West 1983).

Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United

States, 406 U.S. 128, 135-36, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (1972).
The mixed-blood Utes, including defendant's mother,
were terminated from federal supervision under the Ute Partition
Act.

Regarding those mixed-blood Utes, the Act provides:
All statutes of the United States which
affect Indians because of their status as
Indians shall no longer be applicable to such
member over which supervision has been
terminated, and the laws of the several
States shall apply to such member in the same
manner as they apply to other citizens within
their jurisdiction.

25 U.S.C. S 677v (1988) (emphasis added).

The plain language of

this provision has been unquestioned as ending federal criminal
jurisdiction over mixed-blood Ute Indians, and vesting that
jurisdiction in Utah's state courts.

See United States v.

Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 & n. 28 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd,
752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).

Accord. St. Cloud v. United

States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (D.S.D. 1988) (Indians whose
tribes have been "terminated" are subject to state jurisdiction).
Therefore defendant, in claiming to be a mixed-blood Ute, brings
himself within a class of citizens who, although they have Indian
heritage, have been expressly made subject to state criminal
jurisdiction.
Defendant complains that state jurisdiction over his
case should not be found just because of his mother's presence on
the roll of "terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians. He argues that
because he was not yet born when the Ute Partition Act took
20

effect, he cannot be one of the "individuals" who were
"terminated" for federal criminal jurisdiction purposes, unless
he is first afforded a hearing (Br. of Appellant at 37-40).

This

position is untenable, and unsupported by the history of the Ute
Partition Act.
Defendant's complaint is untenable because, by
extension, it would suggest that nobody is bound by any law
passed before his or her birth.

The legislative history of the

Act reveals that it was grounded in an agreement between fullblood and mixed-blood Ute Indians to part company, as distinctive
groups, with only the former group remaining under federal
supervision.

H.R. Rep. No. 2493, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954),

reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3355-3359 (1954)
(copied at Appendix 4 to this brief).

Thus the consent of the

mixed-blood Utes to this arrangement, in 1954, is binding upon
their descendants today.9

Defendant, if he is descended from

"terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians, is subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of Utah state courts.
Defendant also ties his claim of Indian status to his
father's purported eligibility for tribal enrollment (Br. of
Appellant at 36). It is unclear which tribe is allegedly open to
defendant's father.

It appears, however, that defendant is again

referring to the Ute tribe, because he identifies his paternal

9,1

Termination acts" such as the Ute Partition Act have been
roundly criticized in more recent years, and in some instances
repealed. See Felter, 546 F.Supp. at 1004-06. However, the Ute
Partition Act, whether or not a "good" law, remains the law.
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grandfather as an enrolled Uncompahgre (id•), and the Uncompahgre
comprise one "band" of the Ute Indians.

Ute Indian Tribe v.

State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1093 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986).

Thus it

appears that defendant also claims a Ute tribe affiliation
through his father.

Defendant does not say, however, whether his

father is or is not a •'terminated'1 Indian.

On the paternal side,

then, defendant's jurisdictional status is indeterminate.
Given, however, that defendant's more specific claimed
Indian ancestry is traced to his mother, whose Indian status was
clearly terminated for jurisdictional purposes, and that his
claimed Indian affiliations are also to "terminated" mixed-blood
Utes, these considerations should control here.

By affiliating

himself with people who have been terminated from federal
criminal jurisdiction, then, defendant has effectively subjected
himself to state criminal jurisdiction, notwithstanding his
father's uncertain status.

On this basis, the state court had

jurisdiction to try him for forgery under the Ute Partition Act,
and the conviction should be affirmed.
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POINT III
IF THE CONVICTION CANNOT BE AFFIRMED
OTHERWISE, THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE SHOULD BE
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHERE DEFENDANT
SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
A.

Because No Evidence Relating to Defendant's
Claimed Indian Status was Presented in the
Trial Court, there is Nothing to Review on
Appeal.
If this Court applies a strict subject matter

jurisdiction analysis to the Indian jurisdiction question, such
that defendant can raise it even at this late date, and if it
will not affirm defendant's conviction under the Ute Partition
Act, the conviction still cannot be reversed at this time, as
defendant urges.

This Court cannot reach the merits of

defendant's allegation that he is an Indian, because there is no
evidence in the record on this fact-sensitive issue.
Because the issue was never investigated by the trial
court, only defendant's unsupported allegations of Indian blood
and Indian recognition in his brief are before this Court.
Therefore, because appellate courts do not sit to try disputed
issues of fact, it would be premature for this Court to decide
the jurisdictional issue raised by defendant at this time.
Instead, the issue properly belongs in the trial court.
B.

Defendant's Indian Status Claim Should be
Heard bv the Trial Court on a Limited Remand.
If defendant's jurisdictional question was not waived,

the State suggests a remand to the trial court for the limited
purpose of determining whether defendant is an Indian.

If the

trial court determines that defendant is an Indian, such that the
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trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the conviction
must then be set aside.

State Dep't of Social Services v. Viiil.

784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (judgment entered by a court that
lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void).
By airing his jurisdictional challenge in the trial
court, defendant will be availing himself of the forum that is
equipped to decide the issues of fact related to that challenge.
A full evidentiary hearing, unavailable in the appellate court,
can be held.

At such hearing, both defendant and the State can

present evidence relating to defendant's claimed Indian status,
and each side will have the opportunity to test the admissibility
and credibility of the other's evidence.
With the evidence before it, the trial court will
decide whether the allegations that support defendant's claimed
Indian status are true.

The trial court will also be afforded

the initial opportunity to decide which facts are relevant and
necessary, as a matter of law, to prove or defeat defendant's
claim of Indian status.

If defendant is found to be a mixed-

blood Ute, the legal question of state jurisdiction over
defendant under the Ute Partition Act can also be considered.
Once all this is done, a complete record for appellate review of
defendant's jurisdictional challenge will be available in the
event that an appeal is again taken.
C*

In the Trial Court. Defendant Should Bear the
Burden of Proving that He is an Indian.
On remand, defendant should bear the burden of

defeating state court jurisdiction by proving that he is an
24

Indian, because his conviction was entered by a state district
court, a court of general jurisdiction.10

In a post-judgment

challenge to the decision of such a court, the burden of proof is
on the challenger to show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction:
"When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered
by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking
jurisdiction to prove its absence."

Villi, 784 P.2d at 1133.

This allocation of the burden may seem inconsistent
with this court's holding, in State v. Hacren. 802 P.2d 745, 747
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April 23, 1991, Utah Supreme
Court No. 910017, that the burden is on the State to show that
defendant is not an Indian.

It is not inconsistent, however.

In light of Utah's statutory scheme for proof of
criminal jurisdiction, Haaen places the burden of jurisdictional
proof at trial on the State.
201, 76-1-501(3) (1990).

Icl. at 747; Utah Code Ann. SS 76-1-

However, this case involves a

jurisdictional challenge that has not been raised until long
after trial.

Accordingly, Viiil should control on remand, and

the burden should be on defendant, by proving that he is an
Indian, to show that the state court lacked jurisdiction.
Placing the burden of proof upon defendant under these
10

Defendant was tried and convicted in the Eighth Judicial
District Court. Utah's district courts have "original jurisdiction
in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute
. . . ." Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5. "The district court has
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code
Ann. S 78-3-4(1) (1990).
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circumstances would also be sound policy.

As noted earlier, this

jurisdictional challenge may encourage other defendants to raise
the Indian jurisdiction question, even if it was never raised at
trial.

Placing the burden on defendants to prove the absence of

jurisdiction will expedite the handling of such future belated
claims.

It will also help discourage those claims that are

frivolous.

Finally, it will be the defendants pressing such

claims, and not the State, who will have ready access to the
information needed to show that they are Indians, and that
jurisdiction should be examined.
In summary, if defendant's jurisdictional challenge is
to be entertained at this late date, the trial court is the
proper place in which to do so.

If this challenge is thus

remanded to the trial court, the burden should be on defendant to
prove that he is an Indian.
CONCLUSION
Based either on Point One or Point Two of this brief,
defendant's conviction should be affirmed.

However, if this

court cannot affirm on either of those bases, neither should it
reverse the conviction, for no evidence relevant to defendant's
claimed Indian status exists in the record now on appeal.

In

that event, as set forth in Point Three, this case should be
remanded to the trial court, where defendant should bear the

26

burden of proving that jurisdiction was lacking.
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